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Legal Theory and Legal Education
The current call for a legal profession and a legal education dedicated
to such values as the public interest and social justice raises in a dra-
matic way well-known themes in our professional history. For at least
forty years-arguably for much longer-American lawyers have been
struggling with the realization that our legal system is not a dosed,
formal system of rules.' On the contrary, a distinguishing feature of the
American legal system and legal profession has always been their close
and complex relationship with openly political issues. De Tocqueville's
famous observation in 1835 that "scarcely any political question arises
in the United States that is not resolved, sooner or later, into a judicial
question, - was echoed a century later by Morris Cohen's argument
that "we cannot pretend that the United States Supreme Court is
simply a court of law .... [T]he issues before it generally depend on
the determination of ... facts, their consequences, and the values we
attach to these consequences. These are questions of economics, pol-
itics, and social policy which legal training cannot solve unless law
includes all social knowledge. ' 3 While these questions are particularly
apparent in Supreme Court decisions, they are also increasingly present
throughout the work of the legal profession in the lower courts and
in numerous agencies, commissions, and private organizations whose
goals include making and influencing legal-political decisions.4 The
nagging question for the law schools is: what kind of professional
training is appropriate to this kind of legal system?
1. A recent example of this argument which has excited great interest among law
students is Nader, Law Schools and the Law Firms, TiE NEw RrunLac, OcL 11, 1969,
at 20 (reprinted in 54 MINN. L. REv. 493 (1970)). For a general review of educational
debates in the profession and law schools, see Stevens, Aging Mistress: The Law School
in America, 2 CHANGE IN HIGHER EDUCATION 32 (1970). Dissatisfaction with formal con-
ceptions of law among some practitioners has been parallelled by developments in
jurisprudence and specialized branches of legal theory. See, e.g., Dworkin, The Model of
Rules, 35 U. CHL L. REv. 14 (1967); Hughes, Rules, Polic, and Decision Mahing, 77
YALE L.J. 411 (1968); Stone, Towards a Theon, of Constitutonal Law Casebooks, 41 So.
CA. L. R v. 1 (1968); J. SHnLAR, LECAiSm (1964). The dating of the origins of this
realization is somewhat arbitrary. An important example of it, including a discussion
of earlier views, can be found in Llewellyi, A Realistic Jurisprudence-The Next Step,
g0 COLUMr. L. Rev. 431 (1930), K. LLEwELLYN, JUrISPRUDENCE 3 (1962 [hereinafter articles
by Llewellyn which also appear in K. LEWEMLYN, JuRsIpRutENE (1962) will also be
cited to JUnsPRUDNCE].
2. 1 A. DE TocQuEvu=, DEmocRAcy IN A mnuCA 290 (P. Bradley ed. 1945).
3. M. CoHEN, REASON AND LAw 83-84 (1950). For a recent analysis of the Supreme
Court as a "political agency," see M. SHAImo, LAw. AND PoTrCs IN mE SU'azPtE CouUT
(1964).
4. See. e.g., Reich, The New Property, 73 YAx L.J. 733 (1964); Reich, Towards the
Humanistic Study of Law, 74 YALE L.J. 1402 (1965); Cahn & Cahn, The New Sovereign
Immunity, 81 HAv. L. REv. 929, 930 (1968).
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This question has proved to be exceedingly difficult to answer, and
when answers have been proposed, it has been equally difficult to trans-
late them into actual reforms.5 Various reasons have been advanced
to explain this impasse in professional thought and training. A com-
mon explanation locates the obstacles to creative change outside the
law schools: in the anti-intellectualism and narrow interests of the
practicing Bar,6 or in the refusal of government and other social institu-
tions to support legal research on the model of the social and natural
sciences.7 Others have noted certain "structural" problems within the
law schools themselves: the long tradition of faculty "independence"
which frustrates coordination,8 and the ambiguous status of the law
teacher as both a trainer of practitioners and a scholar or researcher.0
Many law school deans and professors have accordingly concluded that
the road to reform lies in specifying, at last, that research of an aca-
demic (rather than vocational) nature is one legitimate function of
law schools as institutions, and cannot be left only to the idiosyncratic
interests of individual teachers. Major reforms have been proposed to
achieve this new institutional goal: the acquisition of funds to support
academic scholars and students and the establishment of multi-dis-
ciplinary divisions or "law centers" devoted to research on pressing
social problems and how law can contribute to their solution.10
In making these proposals, many critics of legal education recognize
that money and institutional structure are not the only elements of
5 A general review of the futility of reform efforts prior to 1942 can be found In
Lasswell & McDougal, Legal Education and Public Policy: Professional Training in the
Public Interest, 52 YALE L.J. 203, 203-207 (1942). The failure of one particular effort-
that of the Columbia Law School faculty to revise the entire curriculum In the mid-
1920's-is documented in great detail in Currie, The Materials of Law Study (pts. 1.2),
3 J. LEGAL ED. 331 (1951), 8 J. LEGAL ED. 1 (1955). Discussion of obstacles to reform after
1942 can be found in Stevens, supra note 1, and Macaulay, Law Schools and the World
Outside Their Doors: Notes on the Margins of "Professional Training in the Public
Interest," 54 VA. L. Rav. 617 (1968).
6. See Goodman & Rabinowitz, Lawyer Opinion on Legal Education: A Sociological
Analysis, 64 YALE L.J. 537 (1955). This study is based on a limited sample and question-
naire, and the authors are modest in their conclusions. Nevertheless, they suggest that
most lawyers are not "policy-makers" and in fact feel a greater need for training In
technical proficiency than in social analysis. Id. at 555. From a different viewpoint, Ralph
Nader argues that the practitioners' and law schools' emphasis on technique over "norma-
tive inquiry" supports an implicit professional policy of subservience to "vested Interests"
and large institutions. See Nader, supra note 1, at 21.
7. See, e.g., Manning, Introduction: New Tasks for Lawyers, in LAW IN A CIIAGING
AmmEcA 1, 3 (G. Hazard ed. 1968).
8. See, e.g., Macaulay, supra note 5, at 620-621.
9. See Bergin, The Law Teacher: A Man Divided Against Himself, 54 VA. L. Rw.
637 (1968).
10. See, e.g., J. STONE, LAw AND THE SOCIAL SCIENcEs 22-24 (1966); Cavers, Legal Educa-
tion in a Forward-Looking Perspective, in LAW IN A CHANGING Ar EIuCA 189 (G. Hazard
ed. 1968); A. Goldstein, The Unfulfilled Promise of Legal Education, in id. at 157;
Manning, supra note 7, and Stevens, supra note 1.
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the problem. The effort to redefine legal scholarship and legal training
for a "public policy" branch of the profession necessarily involves con-
ceptions of the legal system and of the entire society-of how they are
operating at present, and of what should be done (if anything) to
change them." The due as to how these conceptions should be de-
veloped is taken not from jurisprudence and intellectual history, but
from the pressing social problems with which the critics are rightly
concerned: consumer protection, environmental regulation, criminal
law reform, and a host of other issues. Law work in these areas fre-
quently involves the use of theories and methods from the social and
natural sciences, particularly behavioral sciences such as psychology
and sociology and "hard" disciplines such as economics and statistics. 12
It is in this framework that the intellectual explosion of law centers
is expected to take place, while the major philosophical questions of
previous years, concerning the nature and function of law, are in-
creasingly regarded as settled, impenetrable, or irrelevant.13 There
appears to be a broad consensus that efforts should be turned toward
developing more precise, more empirically-based "legal studies" in
particular areas of social pressure and change.' 4
There can be little doubt that such research into "the law in action,"
while called for long ago,1r is still very much needed and worthwhile.
What is less clear is the theoretical or intellectual framework in which
this research should take place. By "theoretical or intellectual frame-
work" is meant a set of ideas which relates studies of particular prob-
11. A rare example of an effort to make these underlying conceptions explicit can
be found in Lasswell & McDougal, supra note 5. Recent arguments which recognize the
intellectual dimension of law school reform include J. STONE, supra note 10, at 24;
Goldstein, supra note 10, at 160; and Nader, supra note 1, at 21.
12. See. e.g., Lasswell & McDougal, supra note 5, at 212-15; Manning, supra note 7,
at 4; L. FRIEMAN, & S. MACAULAY, LAW AND THE BEHAVioRAL ScIENcas vii, 55 (1969).
13. A report of this attitude can be found in Stevens, supra note I, at 37.
14. See, eg., Cavers, supra note 10, at 145; L. Finm.rmN & S. A CmALAY, supra note
12, at vii. Examples of such studies are provided in Kalven, The Quest for the Middle-
Range: Empirical Inquiry and Legal Policy, in LAw iN A Cismz=crNc AMEmcA 56 (G.
Hazard ed. 1968): "The relevant shelf... now includes ... Jerome Carlin's two studies
of the legal profession and Erwin Smigel's study of the Wall Street lawyer, the study of
auto acddent reparation in Michigan by Alfred Conrad and his associates; the participant-
observer study of the Oakland police by Jerome Skolnick, and the study of police proce-
dures in arrest by Wayne LaFave; the experimental study of the pre-trial conference by
Maurice Rosenberg... the study of the American jury by Hans Zeisel and myself; and
the experimental study of the jury and the insanity defense by Rita James Simon."
Id. at 57; see also bibliography at 72-73. Professor Kalven's article is one of the most care-
ful recent discussions of law and the social sciences; his concern is not to dLsmi juris-
prudence or theories of law, but to define the proper relationship betueen empirical
studies and the formation of legal policy. I agree with his concluding slogan that we
must "'empiridze' jurisprudence and intellectualize fact finding." Id. at 72. This essay
is in part a discussion of the pragmatist and realist efforts in that direction.
15. The phrase "law in action" is taken from Pound, Law in Books and Law in
Action, 44 Am. L. Rav. 12 (1910).
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lems to a level of social and professional significance; which tells us,
in other words, why we want to study (for example) police arrest pro-
cedures, and which supplies the concepts and values through which we
understand what we observe. Such frameworks function on a number
of levels: as general orientations to particular problems (e.g., the con-
cept of "due process" in the criminal law);1 as the "boundaries" of a
discipline or a profession (e.g., the appropriate structure of a "legal"
question);' 7 and as models of practice and investigation (e.g., the
"Brandeis brief" as a model for certain kinds of constitutional litiga-
tion). Taken as a whole, a framework provides what Professor Thomas
Kuhn has termed a "paradigm" for the practitioners of an intellectual
craft.'8 By Kuhn's definition, a paradigm is both a "constellation of
beliefs, values, techniques, and so on shared by the members of a given
community [of practitioners]," and "one sort of element in that con-
stellation, the concrete puzzle-solutions which [are used] as models or
examples" for further research.'0
Many of the current proposals to establish empirical research about
particular socio-legal problems in the law schools carry with them an
implicit paradigm which attempts to serve these general professional
functions. Like the proposals themselves, this paradigm is drawn from
a long tradition of American legal thought and activity which was
born in the intellectual-political movements of pragmatism and pro.
gressivism before the First World War, and which later shook the law
schools under the slogan of legal realism. This paradigm, which with
historical license shall be called "legal pragmatism," neither was nor
is the only strand in legal thought about social problems, but it is
clearly the dominant approach in this century.20 Its dominance rests
16. For a discussion of how the concept of due process functions as part of an intel.
lectual framework in the criminal law, see Griffiths, Ideology in Criminal Procedure,
or A Third Model of the Criminal Process, 79 YAE L.J. 359 (1970).
17. This problem has usually been dealt with in the context of jurisprudence, sce,
e.g., H. L. A. HART, THE CONcEPT OF LAw (1961); Dworkin, supra note 1; and Hughes,
supra note 1. It has also received attention, however, in terms of the way lawyers think
about the social implications of legal decisions. See, e.g., Professor Bickel's discussion of
the shift in constitutional theory from the "faith" of the nineteenth century to the
"Progressive realism" of the twentieth in A. BicKn., THm SuPREME COUnT AND rTE IvrA
OF PRoGRnss 14-29 (1970), and the sociological analysis of professional identity in D.
Rueschmeyer, Lawyers and Doctors: A Comparison of Two Professions, in SocIoLooY or
LAw (V. Aubert ed. 1969).
18. See T. KUHN, THE STRucruRE OF ScIENTiC 14,EvOLUTIONS 10-22 (2d ed. 1970).
19. Id. at 175. In the natural sciences works such as Aristotle's Phvsica, Newton's
Principia, and Lavoisier's Chemistry served as paradigms; they provideil general rules
governing inquiry and particular theories which generated coherent traditions of research.
Id. at 10.
20. See, e.g., F. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, V5
COLum. L. REv. 809, 826-27, 835 (1935); M. Cohen, A Critical Sketch of Legal Philoso-
phy in America, in 2 LAw: A CErNatmY oF PRoGRmSS 1835-1935, at 266 (1937); F-rank, A
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on its treatment of the theoretical issues which underlie a public policy
approach to law: the role of values in the law, the concept of utility
or the public good, the relationship of law and politics, and the rela-
tionship of law and empirical or scientific method.
What follows is by no means a history of the pragmatist and related
movements in law, but rather a schematic brief for a number of ideas:
that such history is relevant to current reform efforts; that basic
theoretical questions about law, society, and the social sciences are not
closed; and hence that legal studies, in the sense of research linked to
the behavioral sciences, should not be the exclusive focus of educa-
tional reform. The belief of many reformers seems to be that the prag-
matist tradition has weathered its early difficulties and is now ready
for a flowering of academic research and plans for social change. The
argument of this essay is that on the contrary, legal pragmatism has
been declining in scope and coherence since its inception, and that if
the law schools are serious about intellectual engagement with social
problems (as they should be) they will find themselves, like the social
sciences, drawn into a theoretical crisis of large dimensions.
I. The Pragmatist Origins of Legal Realism
The last large-scale professional effort to change the content and
methods of legal education occurred in the 1930s under the slogan of
"legal realism,"2' and most of the current reformers of legal education
Conflict with Oblivion: Some Observations on the Founders of Legal Pragmatism. 9
RuTGERs L. REv. 425 (1954); J. STONE, SocIAL Ditmms oNs Or LAw AND tUSMTCE 6-15
(1964); A. BIcKmrL, supra note 17, at 11-42; Woodard, The Limits of Legal healism: An
Historical Perspective, 54 VA. L. REv. 689 (1968). Informal remarks supporting this
view are expressed in Corbin, Principles of Law and Their Evolution, 64 YALE UJ. 161
(1954).
21. A major statement describing the views of the realist "group"-including what
they shared and how they differed-can be found in Liewel)n, Some Realism About
Realism, 44 HARv. L. Rv. 1222 (1931), JuRISPRUDENCE 42. The setting of a date for the
emergence of legal realism is somewhat arbitrary. Many realists of the 1920's and 1930's
repeatedly acknowledged their debt (albeit with qualifications) to Hohfeld, Pound, Powell,
Cardozo, and Holmes. See K. LLEwELLYN, The Study of Law as a Liberal Art, in Juns-
rRUDENCE 375, 378, and id. at 491-519; J. FRANK, LW AND THE MODERN MfWND 270-281
(Anchor ed. 1963) [hereinafter cited as LAWi AND THE MODERN MIND]. Profesor Morton
White in SocIAL THOUGHT IN AmRc:A 6 (1949), uses the term "legal realism" to describe
the views of Holmes set forth in Tim Co. ON LAw (1881) and The Path of the Law,
10 HARv. L. REv. 457 (1897). A factor which distinguishes the post-World War I realists
from the earlier critics was the realists' attempt to "translate their jurisprudential ideas
into concrete educational patterns." Twining, Pericles and the Plumber 83 LAw QuAnTEDLy
REv. 596, 407 (1967).
By terming legal realism the "last large-scale" professional effort at clanging legal
theory and legal education, it is meant to refer only to the "quantity" of professional
involvement, and not to undenate the importance and quality of numerous later efforts
and proposals.
1157
The Yale Law Journal
consider themselves heirs of this movement, rather than of the earlier
period suggested by the term "pragmatism." 22 The realist inheritance
is not, however, accepted uncritically. It is now generally recognized
that realism, both as an intellectual movement and as an effort at educa-
tional reform, was misguided in several respects. 23 For example, it is
increasingly doubted that a single "method" or "theory" can serve as
an educational program for all law schools and all varieties of legal
practice;2 4 similarly, the realist effort to formulate a general "scienti-
fic" approach to law is now regarded as too abstract and polemical, and
the issues involved either inherently unscientific or obvious to the
point of sterility.25 These criticisms are valid, and should be pushed
further. The ambiguities and weaknesses of legal realism were not
aberrations, but reflected important problems in the pragmatist tra.
dition of which realism was a part, and which still dominates legal
thinking about social problems.
The realists' critique of established legal thought was based on sev-
eral perceived symptoms of professional malfunctioning. First, the law
schools were having difficulty teaching the skills necessary for effective
practice; modem law work, the realists saw, was far more complex and
varied than the practice of the "country-plus-city lawyer of about 1870"
whose "blurred composite photograph" seemed to lurk behind the law
schools' exclusive focus on case analysis and legal doctrine. 20 Second,
the process of judicial decision was not as "mechanical" as many law-
yers and judges seemed to believe; what "really" happened when a
judge decided a case was far more complex, uncertain, and policy-
oriented than the picture given by traditional law professors and by
judges themselves.27 Third, the profession's intellectual focus on the
22. See, e.g., Woodard, supra note 20, and Goldstein, supra note 10. For a friendly
criticism of pragmatic or sociological jurisprudence's failure to influence legal education
in the pre-Realist period, see M. COHEN, AEs ucAN THOUGHr. A CRITICAL SKETcu 158-162
(1954).
23. A sympathetic discussion which suggests some of the problems can be found in
Gilmore, Legal Realism: Its Cause and Cure, 70 YALE L.J. 1037 (1961). A much more de-
tailed critique is presented in J. SHKLAR, supra note 1, at 18-21, 93-110.
24. See, e.g., Stevens, supra note 1, at 35, 41, and Cavers, supra note 10. As Professor
Stevens points out, this insight is hardly new; it was first put forward by Alfred Reed In
TRAINING FOR THE PUBLIC PROFESSION OF LAw (1921).
25. Cf. Kalven, supra note 14.
26. Llewellyn, On What is Wrong With So-Called Legal Education, 5 Couzr. L. Rv.
651, 653 (1935). See also Frank, Why Not a Clinical Lawyers' School?, 81 U. PA. L. REV.
907 (193).
27. Realist versions of this observation and argument can be found in LAW AND ThiE
MODERN MIND at 8-12 & passim; Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence-The Next Step,
supra note 1; On Reading and Using the Newer Jurisprudence, 40 CoLur. L. REV, 581
(1940), in JURISPRUDENCE 128. The point was not, of course, original with the reallsts.
See, e.g., J. AUSTIN, Tin PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DsTEaasINED 191 (Library of Ideas
ed. 1954), and the discussion of Austin's views on judicial legislation in H. L. A. Hart,
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rigid application of legal rules blocked reform efforts generated by
the changing needs of large numbers of Americans from many social
classes.
28
All of these perceptions reflect what has been called "the revolt
against formalism."2 9 The realist message, directed at such diverse pro-
fessional points as teaching students how to read cases, showing judges
the true significance of applying doctrine, and developing a new juris-
prudence, reiterated basic pragmatist themes: distrust of rules, abstract
concepts, "the word," deductive logic, and mechanical application of
doctrine; enthusiastic interest in "the facts," behavior, "dynamic" an-
alysis and "experimental" decision-making. 30 But at the core of the
often passionate debate about what was to be done lay a disturbing
vagueness about the precise nature of the formalist malady. On close
examination realism appears as a many-layered attack on formalism:
on empirical ignorance, doctrinal abstraction, and oppressive social
values.
In challenging these related but different elements in orthodox legal
thought, the realists built on the earlier critique presented by the
pragmatists, and shared-indeed, magnified-the pragmatists' intel-
lectual weaknesses: a failure to distinguish different levels and points
of criticism, and a core ambiguity about the role of values in social and
legal thought. One result was the realists' failure to develop a con-
sistent understanding of formalism both as an intellectual system and
as an historical episode in American law. Another was a gap in the
Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HAiv. L. REv. 593, 603-10 (1958);
Holmes, The Path of the Law, in O. IV. HoL MEs, Co.Ecrro LEGAL PASrmns 181 (1920)
[hereinafter dted as HOLUMS PAPES]; B. CAnozo, THE NxxuRtn or TiE JUDiCIAL Procass
10-11 (1921).
28. See, e.g., Llewelyn, Some Realism About Realism, supra note 21, at 1236-1237,
JURISPRUDENCE at 55-56; FaNK, LAw AND TBE MODERl MIND XXLx-XX; Frank, Realism in
Jurisprudence, 7 Am. L.Nw SCHOOL REv. 1063 (1933); Frank, Cardozo and the Upper Court
Myth, 13 LAW & CoI'maxp. PRoa. 369, 285 (1948). For a discussion of the broad social base
of the Populist and Progressive movements, see R. HorsrADom, Tim AGE oF REronrm (1955).
29. See AM. WVHrE, SOCIAL. THOUGrr iN Am.EmcA Tim REVOLT AcAmNsr FonmLu._Si.
(1957 ed.). Professor White sees the "revolt" of legal realism (by which he means the
work of Holmes) as part of a broad intellectual movement in late nineteenth.century
America which affected philosophy, history, economics, and psychology as well as law.
"Pragmatism, instrumentalism, institutionalism, economic determinism, and legal realism
exhibit striking philosophical kinships. They are all suspicious of approaches which are
excessively formal; they all protest their anxiety to come to grips with reality, their
attachment to the moving and vital in social life." Id. at 6. For discussions of the realists
of the 1930s in terms of their attack on formalism, see Gilmore, supra note 23, at 1038-
1039, J. SHRLAR, supra note 1, at 93-99; Dworkin, supra note 1, at 16-17.
So. See Llewellyn, A Realistic jurisprudence-The Next Step, supra note 1; Some
Realism About Realism, supra note 21; On What is Wrong With So.Called Legal Educa-
tion, supra note 26, at 656, 669; LAW AND TIM MODERN MIND, passim.; cf. Frank, Blook
Review, 54 HAav. L. Rv. 905, 910 n.18 (1941). A classic statement of these pragmatist
themes can be found in IV. JAMES, PSAGiIATLSM (1907).
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realist reform proposals between the level of empirical method and
the level of educational and professional change.
To make this argument this essay will first trace the pragmatist
origins of ihe revolt against formalism, and attempt to sketch its social
as well as its intellectual implications. Then it will turn to what two
members of the realist movement-Jerome Frank and Karl Llewellyn-
did with the pragmatist tradition, and examine their anti-formalist
ideas about law and legal education.
A. The Pragmatist Critique of Formalism
A broad intellectual revolt occurred around the turn of the century
against nineteenth-century "formalism" and its treatment of politics,
law, social change, and knowledge itself.8 1 The core of this revolt was
the argument that people should formulate ideas and relate them to
the world of experience in a "pragmatic" fashion. A classic statement
of this new method was presented by William James in 1907, in a
lecture which anticipated many of the ideas which were to occupy the
realists in the 1930's:
Metaphysics has usually followed a very primitive kind of
quest. You know how men have always hankered after unlawful
magic, and you know what a great part in magic words have al-
ways played. If you have his name, or the formula of incantation
that binds him, you can control the spirit . . . or whatever the
power may be ....
But if you follow the pragmatic method, you cannot look on
any such word as closing your quest. You must bring out of each
word its practical cash-value, set it at work within the stream of
your experience. It appears less as a solution than as an indication
of the ways in which existing realities may be changed.
Theories thus become instruments, not answers to enigmas....
Being nothing essentially new, [pragmatism] harmonizes with
many ancient philosophic tendencies. It agrees with nominalism
.. in always appealing to particulars; with utilitarianism in em-
phasizing practical aspects; with positivism in its disdain for...
metaphysical abstractions.
No particular results then, so far, but only an attitude of orien-
tation, is what the pragmatic method means. The attitude of
looking away from first things, principles, 'categories,' supposed
31. The timing of this intellectual revolt extends considerably on 'either side of 1900.
Its philosophic origins lie in the work of Chauncey Wright and Charles Peirce in the 18603
-and 1870s, when they were members of an intellectual group which included both Holmej
and William James. See P. HOsMADM, SoCIAL DARIWINISM IN AMrEcAN Tnouaitr 125-127
(1944). Other discussions of the pragmatist revolt can be found in M. Wntr, supra note 29,
and C. LAscH, THE Nv RADicAmSm iN AMEmCA 1889-1963 (1965).
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necessities; and of looking towards last things, fruits, conse-
quences, facts.32
The liberating energy of a philosophy which treated ideas as instru-
ments was readily apparent to lawyers struggling with the fixed con-
ceptions of legal formalism. According to Pound, legal thought had
been dominated for much of the nineteenth century by varieties of
historical idealism.s In post-Civil War America this took the form of
a curious mixture: a ruthless desire to analyze the law rigorously in
terms of a few fundamental principles, many of which reflected the
core value of "free individual self-assertion,"34 coupled with an almost
mystical method of justifying or legitimating these principles on the
basis of the divine or natural order, 5 oracular fragments from medie-
val law,36 and dubious uses of history and "strong" precedent.37 The
result was what Llewellyn was later to call the Formal Style, and which
other writers branded as a "logical," "mechanical," or "fundamen-
talist" method of judicial decision. 38
The pragmatist attack on this tradition in law was stated in its purest
version by Pound. "All the nineteenth-century schools," he wrote,
"were agreed upon the futility of conscious action .... They conceived
of a slow and ordered succession of events... whereby things perfected
themselves by evolving to the limit of their idea."' 2 Pragmatism, in
contrast, "sees validity in actions, not in that they realize the idea, but
to the extent that they are effective for their purpose and in purposes
to the extent that they satisfy a maximum of human demands."40 The
task of law was the adjustment of human conflict, "a great task of social
engineering;" 4' the method of pragmatic jurisprudence was "the ad-
justment of principles and doctrines to the human conditions they are
32. IV. JA.mes, PRAGMAISM 4647 (Meridian ed. 1955).
33. INTERPRTATIONS OF LEGAL HImORY 10 (1923).
34. Id. at 54, 64-65. See also J. Husr, THE GRo uT oF Amruc., LAIw: Tim LAw
MAKERS 357-358 (1950).
35. See A. BIcKEL, supra note 17, at 14-15.
36. IrN RPrATIOtNS oF LEG.AL H stoRy, supra note 33, at 43, 50-52.
37. See K. LLmvEL.LYN, Tnm CoMMBON Lmw TFrnoN 35-41 (1960); on precedent as
the organizing principle of a process of judicial decision, see R. VA.s smo,, THm JUDICIAL
DEcIsION 39-83 (1961).
38. For Holmes' discussion of the fallacy of the logical form of judicial decisions, see
The Path of the Law, in HoLMrEs PAPERS at 180-181; for Frank's discussion of "legal
fundamentalism," see LAw AND THE MODEMR MIND 53-61, 127-158.
39. INTiRPRETATIONS OF LEGAL HoroRY, supra note 33, at 11.
40. Id.
41. SOCIAL CONTROL THROUGH LAiW 64 (1942). The engineering metaphor was also
used in INTERPRETAToNs oF LEGAL H-rORY 141-165 (1923). Professor Latch tees adiust-
ment of conflict through social engineering as a major theme of the "new radicahsim"
[progressive pragmatism]; see C. LAscm, supra note 31, at 162.
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to govern rather than to assumed first principles ...."42 Justice, in this
approach, was conceived as "such an adjustment of relations and or-
dering of conduct as will make the goods of existence, the means of
satisfying human claims to have things and do things, go round as far
as possible with the least friction and waste." 43
Pound saw pragmatism's great contribution as restoring man's belief
in the efficacy of "conscious action" to adapt the social system to utili-
tarian ends.44 Pragmatism thus implied a particular direction of human
action-conscious reform of the social ground rules of private com-
petition-which broke with the assumptions of nineteenth century
legal thought. "Action" itself was no novelty. The most fervent sup-
porters of legal formalism were the great corporation lawyers of the
turn of the century, such as William Guthrie and Elihu Root."I How-
ever, these "formalist" practitioners were not Dickensian barristers
mumbling ancient formulas, but aggressive business lawyers who,
under the banner of immutable legal principles, had no qualms about
helping radically to transform American industry, politics, urban life,
and ultimately our entire culture.40 What distinguished pragmatism
from formalism as a social theory was its argument that man could act
not only within the faith of "free individual self-assertion" but that
he could question that faith and change it in order to establish a more
just, humane, and efficient social system. 47
The intellectual source of the pragmatists' new self-confidence in
social reform lay in their attempt to collapse the rigid distinction be-
tween "concepts" and "facts"; to make the world of thought more open
to the harsh realities and "dramatic insecurity" of human experience,
4
and conversely, to make the world of fact more amenable to experi-
ment and change in the light of reason.49 Intellectually it was an
attempt, in William James' words, to "mediat[e] and reconcil[e]" the
42. Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 COLUm.. L. REv. 605, 609-610 (1908).
43. SOCIAL CONTROL THROUGH LAw 65 (1942). A substantially similar statement of the
task of the legal order, citing William James for support, can be found in INTEUrrATIONS
OF LEGAL HIsTORY 157 (1923).
44. INTERPRETATIONS OF LEGAL HISTORY, supra note 33, at 11.
45. See, e.g., W. GuTrHmE, MAGNA CARTA AND OTHER ADDrssES (1916); Root, Some
Duties of American Lawyers to American Law, 14 YALE L.J. 63 (1901); see also M, Coitaw,
The Conservative Lawyer's Legend of the Magna Carta and The Legal Calvinism of
Elihu Root, in LAW AND THE SOCIAL ORDER (1933).
46. A superb short discussion of the corporation lawyers' role in this transformation
can be found in Howe, Book Review, 60 HARv. L. REv. 838 (1947). See also J. Hunmr, supra
note 34, at 359-375, and G. MARTIN, CAusS AND CONFLi-rs: TnIE CENTENNIAL HISTORY oV
THE ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NzW YORK 187-200 (1970).
47. See R. HOFSTADTER, supra note 31, at 125; A. BICIEL, supra note 17, at 19.
48. See quotations from William James in R. HOFSTADTER, supra note 31, at 133, 180.
49. One of the best expositions of this pragmatist theme is C. LAScai, supra note 31,
at 141-180. See also M. WHITE, supra note 29, passim.
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ancient strands of idealism and empiricism, of faith and science.r0
Politically it implied an effort to create, or at least to contribute to, a
party of "critical intelligence" and moderate reform;u* in legal terms,
to mediate between the ideas of law as an "intelligible norm" and law
as pure command.-2 It is not surprising that intellectuals found prag-
matism attractive; it defined a theory of knowledge in such a way as to
justify their intervention in social and political affairs.0 It should be
even less surprising that many lawyers, being among the most activist
intellectuals, explicitly or implicitly adopted pragmatism as their
framework for thinking about law and social problems.4
The ties between legal thought and philosophical pragmatism are
obvious in the explicit relationship between Pound and James. Less
obvious, but perhaps more influential in the legal profession, was the
special twist given to pragmatism in the work of Holmes.0 Holmes was
less optimistic than Pound about man's capacity to maximize his col-
lective well-being; his approach to law emphasized the skeptical and
positivist strands in pragmatism's intellectual coalition. He attacked
the formalists' moral absolutism in his controversial "bad man" ap-
proach to the law; he advised young lawyers to "look at [the law] as a
bad man, who cares only for the material consequences which such
knowledge [of the law] enables him to predict .... ."5G In a somewhat
similar vein, he argued that the "logical form" of judicial decisions
did not guide lawyers to the actual processes by which judges decided
cases; "the felt necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and political
50. PRAGAxTAIS, supra note 32, at 61.
51. For sources of quotations and a detailed analysis of the ties between pragmatism
and political moderation, see C. W. MILLS, SOCIOLOGY AND PRAG.mATIm 262-76, 325-37,
428-63 (1. Horowitz ed. 1964). James' account of the psychology of pragmatism suggests
a political metaphor of moderate change. "[A] new idea is then adopted.... It pre-
serves the older stock of truths with a minimum of modification, stretching them just
enough to make them admit the novelty. . . . New truth is always a go-between, a
smoother-over of transitions." PRAGmATis., supra note 52, at 50-51.
52. See F. Neumann, The Change in the Function of Law in Modern Society, in TiA
DnisocRATIc AmD THE AUTHORTARIAN STATE 22, 26 (1957). for a discussion of the classic
conflict between these two conceptions of law.
53. See C. LAscH, supra note 31, at 141-224.
54. See R. HOFSTADmT, supra note 28, at 157-164. Explaining the progressive reforms
espoused by some corporation lawyers, Professor Hofstadter notes that in the East "Pro-
gressivism was a mild and judicious movement, whose goal was not a sharp change in the
social structure, but rather the formation of a responsible elite . . . [,] a leadership
occupying, as Brandeis so aptly put it, 'a position of independence between the wealthy
and the people, prepared to curb the excesses of either."' eld. at 163-164.
55. Holmes' relations with philosophic and other varieties of pragmatism were com-
plex, and he explicitly rejected the label of "pragmatism" when it came to signify James'
philosophy. See 1 HoL ms-LAsm LErm 52-53 (M. Howe-Atheneum ed. 1963). For discus.
sions of ideas which Holmes shared with the pragmatists, see Howe, Introdudion to
0. HOLmES, Tnm COMMON LAW xiii (M. Howe ed. 1963); M. WITE, supra note 29, at
74-75, 104-106; and C. W. Mills, supra note 51, at 109-13.
56. Hoimrs PAPms at 171.
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theories ... have had a good deal more to do than the syllogism in de-
termining the rules by which men should be governed."57
Holmes' attacks on logical formalism and moral absolutism identi-
fied, on a theoretical level, the forces which would lead to succeeding
waves of reform efforts, from sociological jurisprudence through legal
realism to "public interest law" in our own times. The proposition
that the life of the law was "not logic but experience '" had large im-
plications for judicial decision-making and legal scholarship. It placed
a responsibility on the judge, as Holmes noted, to be the conscious
master of previously inarticulate intuitions of public policy; it charted
a new direction for legal scholarship in which Holmes' own work was
an important step--"the exploration and exposure of the social and
ethical roots of doctrine."' 9 The later efforts of the realists to expand
legal scholarship and reform legal education followed a basic prag-
matist theme: the practical and theoretical pressures of "experience"
on thought in general, and in particular on the specialized machinery
of the law.
The intellectual price of the pragmatist approach, however, was high.
The effort to connect ideas and experience, reason and power, con-
tinually raised problems which could not be contained in the prag-
matist framework of intelligent perception of concrete consequences.
These problems were generally evaded through ambiguous mixing of
the descriptive and the normative, the political and the philoso-
phical.60 Holmes, for example, was often cryptic about his "stance" as
a critic and about the objects of his criticism. In The Path of the Law
he at times assumed the role of the positivist observer, the "judge as
spectator,"'" concerned only with dispassionate observation and predic-
tion. At other times he took the position of the judge as interpreter
57. THE COMMON LAW, supra note 55, at 1. Holmes repeated this point in several
essays, notably in The Path of the Law: "The language of judicial decision is mainly the
language of logic. And the logical method and form flatter that longing for certainty and
repose which is in every human mind. But certainty generally is illusion.... Behind the
logical form lies a judgment as to the relative worth and importance of competing legis.
lative grounds, often an inarticulate and unconscious judgment ... yet the very root and
nerve of the whole proceeding." HoLmEs PAPErs at 181.
58. "The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience." Tim ColutoN
LAw, supra note 55, at 1.
59. Howe, Introduction to THE CoMMoN LAW, supra note 55, at xix.
60. A discussion of the tension between the ethical and empirical strands in pragma.
tism can be found in M. WHliE, supra note 29, at 203-219, 236-246. For a parallel analysis
of the progressive-pragmatists' confusion of the political and the ctiltural, see C, IAmul,
supra note 31.
61. See Rogat, Mr. Justice Holmes: Some Modern Views-The Judge as Spectator,
32 U. CHi. L. REy. 213 (1964), and Mr. Justice Holmes: A Dissenting Opinion, 15 STAN.
L. REv. 254 (1963), for important analyses of the ambiguous nature of Holmes' judicial
approach to the legal rights of aliens, political dissenters, and Negroes.
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of community values, concerned with constructing a more "rational
and civilized" legal system. 2 The pragmatists, including Holmes, tried
to link the levels of description and prescription with an intellectual
method which appealed to common-sense standards of experience and
effectiveness, but which actually contained quite complex (and am-
biguous) assumptions about the nature of knowledge and its relation-
ship to the word of action.02 Perhaps the best symbol of this attempted
resolution is the metaphor of the social engineer-a craftsman who
embodies both scientific rationality and the skills of practical im-
plementation.63 The danger in such a metaphor is its definition of the
social function of reason as prediction and control; it "substitute[s] a
technocratic slogan for what ought to be a reasoned moral choice ....
[and] assume[s] the bureaucratic perspective within which--once it is
fully adopted-there is much less moral choice available.""°
B. The Realists' Approach to Theory and Education
The realists followed Holmes in seeing that the formalist paradigm
of "applying rules" was not an adequate model of the legal system.
Without clearly recognizing the complexity of the effort, the realists
attempted to develop an alternative paradigm of scholarship and edu-
cation which incorporated the effects of the "many non-rule ingre-
dients in the making of court decisions."0 5 Thus much of the realist
work on legal education was concerned with establishing "post-for-
malist" methods of study and practice. These proposals were influenced
by two metaphors: that of the scientific method and that of skilled
craftsmanship. 6 Both metaphors embodied a pragmatic model of the
62. See Hor.ls PAPERS at 186, and the discussion of Holmes' ieus in Howe, The
Positivism of Mr. Justice Holmes, 64 HARV. L. REv. 529 (1951) and Holmes' Positivism--A
Brief Rejoinder, 64 HAiIv. L. REv. 937 (1951).
62a. A careful discussion of the subtle relationship between description and analysis
in Holmes' work may be found in M. HowE, JusrTcE OLiVE WENDELL HoatEs: TIE
PRovnrc YEARS, 1870-1882, at 65-67, 14041, 151-59 (1963). For a general discussion of
conceptions of knowledge and their implications for academic and political activity, see
A. GOULDNER, THE COMING CRISIS OF IVEsrERN SOCIOLOGY 491-94 (1970).
63. For examples of the engineering metaphor, see sources cited in note 41 supra. See
also Professor White's discussion of Dewey's concepts of "creative intelligence" and "politi-
cal technology" in M. WHITE, supra note 29, at 128-146 and 243-246.
64. C. W. MILLS, TIM SOCIOLOGICAL IMAGINATION 131 (1959, Penguin ed. 1970). Other
critical discussions of social engineering include R. L'Nv, KNOWLEDiEC FOR WIIAT? (1939);
J. SHKLAR, supra note 1, at 93-110, and Shklar, Decisionism, in No.mros VII: RAnioNL
DECISION (C. Freidrich ed. 1964); and Mfarcuse, Remarks on a Redefinition of Culture,
DAFDALus, Winter 1965, at 190, 193-197.
65. J. FRANK, Preface to the Sixth Printing, LAw AND TnM MODERN MIND at ocuvii.
66. The scientific method was seen as a way of bringing legal doctrine into contact
with the facts of social behavior: through focus on the "behavioral uniformities" of offi-
cials and laymen (see, e.g., Llewellyn, The Theory of Legal 'Science', 20 N.C.L. Rv. 1,
23 n.27 (1941), and the views of Walter W. Cook quoted in Lw AND TIM kfODMnN ?dnn
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relationship between ideas and practice. The scientist and the crafts-
man were conceived as flexible and experimental; above all, they were
concerned with particular and concrete phenomena, and their method
was to adapt theory and ideas to the reality of nature and human
needs. The realists wanted to inject a similar spirit into legal study
and practice; hence their insistence that realism was not a "philosophy"
or a "theory," but was rather, like pragmatism, a "method" which
Jerome Frank called "experimental" and which Llewellyn termed "the
descriptive or the technological branch of [the] discipline."'01
The strengths and weaknesses of this approach can be seen dramat-
ically in the work of Jerome Frank. Rules, argued Frank, were not the
key to judicial decisions, particularly at the trial level where the vast
majority are made.08 The most important factor affecting a decision
was the process by which the judge perceived facts-a process
linked to personal biases and intuitions, and about which the legal
profession was largely ignorant. Frank recognized that there was often
no general agreement about social values and their appropriate weight
in interpreting legal rules."9 But he preferred to leave that abstract
struggle to others; what absorbed his attention was the problem of
applying any rule, settled or not, to a concrete fact situation.
By focusing on this level of analysis, Frank's work remained within
the limits of the pragmatist tradition. This is not to say that he was un-
aware of issues beyond those limits; for example, he quite correctly
criticized Cardozo for confusing the problem of formal logic with the
problem of fixed legal premises. 7 This point was later developed by
H. L. A. Hart, and is central to understanding formalism as an intel-
lectual system.
What precisely is it for a judge to commit this error, to be a
"formalist" .... [I]t is said that in the formalist error courts
make an excessive use of logic .... But just how in being a for-
at 139-140), the effort to construct predictive hypotheses (see, e.g., Llewellyn, The Theory
of Legal 'Science', supra, and LAW AND THE MODERN MIND, supra), and the skepticism of
the "scientific spirit" (see J. FRANK, CouRts ON TRIAL 219 (Princeton Univ. Press ed. 1949)
[hereinafter cited as COURTS ON TRIAL]. Some of the realists, such as Jerome Frank and
Karl Llewellyn, also attempted to articulate a post-formalist "art" or "craft" of law work
which would integrate empirical knowledge with legal ideals (see, e.g., COURTS ON TRIAL
at 221; Llewellyn, On the Good, The True, The Beautiful in Law, 9 U. C. L. REv.
224 (1942). JURISPRUDENC at 191).
67. See LAW AND THE MODERN MIND at 105, and K. LLEWELLYN, Tntr CozMMON LAW
TRADITION, Appendix B, at 509 n.2 (1960).
68. See LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 140-141; COURTs ON TRIAL 317; Cardozo and the
upper Court Myth, supra note 28, at 374-75.
69. See COURTS ON TRIAL 369.
70. Cardozo and the Upper Court Myth, supra note 28, at 871-372.
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malist does a judge make an excessive use of logic? It is clear that
the essence of his error is to give some general term an interpreta-
tion which is blind to social values and consequences .... But logic
does not prescribe the interpretation of terms.... Logic is silent
on how to classify particulars-and this is the heart of a judicial
decision. So this reference to logic ... is a misnomer for some-
thing else.... [The judge] either does not see or pretends not to
see that the general terms of this rule are susceptible of different
interpretations and that he has a choice left open uncontrolled by
linguistic conventions. Instead of choosing in the light of social
aims, the judge fixes the meaning in a different way. He either
takes the meaning that the word most obviously suggests in its
ordinary nonlegal context... or still worse, he thinks of a stan-
dard case and then arbitrarily identifies certain features in it...
as [necessary and sufficient for the use of the term] irrespective of
the social consequences of giving it this interpretation. 7'
But for Frank, this point was of only marginal importance. What
concerned him was Cardozo's (and most of the profession's) fixation
on the intricacies of rule interpretation, and their failure to recognize
the uncertainty and apparent irrationality of many trial court deci-
sions. Frank hoped that by directing the profession's attention to the
realities of the lower courts he would generate energy for reform.
72
His points about delay, dishonesty, unbridled discretion, and ig-
norance of the subtle processes of perception were important and
worth making, and perhaps still are. But taken as an exclusive focus,
they limited reform to the construction of an honest and efficient sys-
tem of adjudication. By defining the judicial process in terms of finding
facts and doing equity between individual parties,73 he assumed that
substantive values would somehow emerge from the impartial judge's
perception of the facts of a case. Such an assumption makes Frank's
approach largely irrelevant to decisions involving public policy, for
what is at issue in such decisions is not primarily facts, but the weigh-
ing of values and principles, and the core of the decision is
what rule or policy should govern the case. Even in the area of private
law, Frank's strong distrust of the tyranny of rules and concepts led
him to understate the problems of value conflict, of adjudicating in-
dividual claims in the light of community interests, and of the subtle
71. Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, supra note 27, at 610.611.
See also R. WAssastom, supra note 87, at 22-24.
72. Cardozo and the Upper Court Myth, supra note 28, at 374, 365.
73. For Frank's own preferred model of the judicial process (i.e. the trial courts), ee
LAW AND THE MODERN MiDn at 148-49, 168; and his discussion of the European theory of
"free law" in id. at 501-306. For an analysis of the concept of equity as an organizing
principle of judicial decisions, see R. WAss.smo.r, supra note 37, at 84-117.
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difficulty of classifying particulars, which involves not only the percep-
tion of facts, but the simultaneous interpretation of the meaning of
rules.74
Frank's concern with the effective administration of individualized
justice heavily influenced his ideas about the reform of legal education.
The core of his proposed lawyers' school was an effort to sensitize law
students to the "realities"-in Holmes' language, the "material conse-
quences"-of the legal system. Training by observation and supervised
practice would serve the double purpose implied by Holmes' theory:
law students would become simultaneously better practitioners
(through accurate knowledge of reality) and more vigorous reformers
(through concrete experience with courthouse abuses).l5 The gap in
Frank's program occurred precisely at this juncture between "effective
practice" and "effective reform"-the same point at which Holmes
had lapsed into cryptic ambiguity. Frank never specified how knowl-
edge of courthouse realities alone would necessarily lead to ideas of
reform. Aside from breaches of elementary honesty, it is hard to see
how students could conceive of certain kinds of "inadequacies" (such
as unbridled discretion) without reference to general concepts of the
legal process. Frank implicitly recognized the need to transcend the
observation of concrete particulars by advocating the study of legal
problems "in the light supplied by the other social studies ... history,
ethics, economics ... psychology [etc.]"7 0 But here he failed not only
to specify what he meant conceptually, but also to indicate as a prac-
tical matter who could supply such intellectual syntheses and what a
student would do with them professionally even if they could be ob.
tained. At this point Frank's pragmatism failed even on the level of
the practical, for he did not incorporate into his proposals for legal
education any analysis of the political or professional difficulties,
dangers, and costs of reform.
Jerome Frank's work reflects the realist tendency to abandon general
concepts and become submerged in the very reality it seeks to change.
Karl Llewellyn arrived at a similar position by a somewhat different
route. For Llewellyn, like Frank, the essence of the formalist error
74. Cf. Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, supra note 27, at 610.611.
At times Frank noted that the determination of facts and the interpretation of rules were
"intertwined" (see LAw AND THE MODERN MIND at 144) but he did not make this point a
systematic part of his approach.
75. See CoURTs ON TRIAL 235, 240.
76. Id. at 239.
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was rigid adherence to abstract rules. 77 But unlike Frank, Llewellyn
based his realist approach on the possibility of formulating instru-
mental concepts or rules, flexible doctrines with specific purposes in-
formed by broad intellectual inquiry and precise attention to behavior
and consequences. 8 To achieve this he had to go beyond the model
of individual equity79 and examine the general role of concepts as
used in the judicial process.
The sense impressions which make up what we call observation
are useless unless gathered into some arrangement. Nor can
thought go on without categories.
A realistic approach would, however, put forward two sug-
gestions on the making of such categories. The first suggestion
rests primarily upon the knowledge that to classify is to disturb.
It is to build emphases ... which obscure some of the data under
observation .... [T]rue relevancy [of the data] can be determined
only as the inquiry advances. For this reason a realistic approach
to any new problem would begin by scepticism as to the adequacy
of the received categories for ordering the phenomena effectively
toward a solution .... The suggestion then comes to this: that
with the new purpose in mind one approach the data afresh,
taking them in as raw a condition as possible, and discovering how
far and how well the available traditional categories really cover
the most relevant of the raw data.. . . The [other] counsel of the
realistic approach... would be the constant back-checking of the
category against the data .... 80
In this passage Llewellyn is wrestling with the problem which oc-
cupied Holmes and Cardozo before him, and Hart, Wasserstrom, and
many others afterwards: when does the judge have a "choice" about
the meaning of legal concepts and rules, and what is the nature of the
choice legitimately open to him? For Llewellyn, the answer appeared
to lie in the "science" and "craft" of law, which together formed the
77. See K. LLEwEuLYN, TuE CoMoN LAW TRADITIoN 3841 (1960) [hereinafter cited as
ComnmoN LAiW TRADrnoN], On The Good, The True, The Beautiful, in Law, 9 U. Cu. L
REv. 224 (1942), JuRsPRUDENcE 167, 183.
78. The above summary is based on A Realistic Jurisprudence--The Next step. suplra
note 1, and Some Realism About Realism, supra note 21. See also On Reading and Using
the Newer Jurisprudence, supra note 27, at 5834, 594-5, JusPRUDENc 131 and 143.
79. Cf. Jerome Frank's model of the judicial process: "The judge, at his best, is an
arbitrator, a 'sound man' who strives to do justice to the parties by exercising a wise
discretion with reference to the peculiar circumstances of the case." LAw AND MrE MODEMN
MiND at 168.
80. A Realistic Jurisprudence-The Next Step, supra note 1, at 453-454, JtnuSPrDE'ncz
at 27-28.
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realist method.81 Llewellyn's concept of science, like Holmes', serves
a double purpose. It functions first as an empirical cue to the judge
that precedent must be re-examined, and second, as a normative
method for determining the real rule or purpose embedded in social
practices. At the first stage, the judge examines doctrine to see if it
accounts for "all the results" 82 (presumably results in past cases); if it
does not, he must look beyond rules to the "right Reason" 83 of the
social and legal practices in question. In determining the content of
"Reason," the judge uses science in the second sense of finding values;
the real rule and its purposes are discovered through countless close
studies of social practices and the consequences of implementing dif-
ferent shades of doctrine.
84
Llewellyn himself recognized that his statement of the realist
method was but a partial suggestion about where the techniques of
"best practice" might lie.85 The process of "checking" or "squaring"
doctrine against "the raw data," for example, was never clearly spelled
out, and seemed to imply that certain kinds of meaning were inherent
in the data "itself." 80 The concept of craft was based heavily on general
values such as "the felt duty to justice"87 and "right Reason"8 which
Llewellyn fleshed out only with vigorous adjectives and aesthetic
analogies. The result was similar to other work in the pragmatist tradi-
tion: an undefined mixing of the descriptive and the normative, and a
tendency to conceive of harmonious ideas and values as somehow "in-
herent" in the infinite variety of particular detail.89
The assumption of a community of interest, a harmony of ends, was
also prominent in Llewellyn's proposals for educational reform. Like
81. See On Reading and Using the Newer Jurisprudence, supra note 27, at 587, Jums.
pRuDENCE at 135.
82. Id. (emphasis in the original).
83. See On the Good, The True, The Beautiful, in Law, supra note 77, in JuusrnvmENac
at 186; see also id. at 179-180.
84. See The Theory of Legal 'Science,' supra note 66, at 13-14, 23.
85. See On Reading and Using the Newer Jurisprudence, supra note 27, in Juruspiu.
DENcE at 156-157.
86. Cf. THE COMMON LAW TRADrnoN, Appendix B, at 510.
87. Id. at 121.
88. JURISPRUDENCE at 186.
89. This tendency was realized in THE CoMaON LAw TRADITION, in which Llewellyn
presented judicial craftsmanship in terms of the judge "finding" norms and principles In
the "type-situation" exemplified in the particular case. See id. at 121-128. Such norms and
principles can of course be found in relevant social practices. But Llewellyn went further;
he approvingly quoted Levin Goldschmidt's argument that:
Every fact-pattern of common life, so far as the legal order can take it In, carries
within itself its appropriate, natural rules, its right law. This is a natural law which
is real, not imaginary ... it is ... not external or changeless or everywhere the same,
but it is indwelling in the very circumstances of life. The highest task of law.giving
consists in uncovering and implementing this immanent law.
Quoted in id. at 122.
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Frank, Llewellyn sought to achieve both increased technical com-
petence and more professional commitment to the public good
through immersing students in the concrete details of law work. He
urged teachers of the case method to reject abstract analysis of ratio-
nalizations and to attack cases "from the front," as they appeared to
the lawyer as he handled them 0 The focus on the practitioner's art,
in Llewelyn's hands, opened out into broad intellectual inquiry. For
in order to "mak[e] the situation come alive enough... to any student,
so that he can begin to think actively, instead of listening passively, on
points of prediction, advocacy, and inventive counselling,"0' the stu-
dent had to know a great deal about the "situation" in which the case
arose, and to have some sense of the complex "craft" through which
the law related to the situation. To accomplish this Llewellyn pro-
posed intensive studies, rather than surveys, of current legal develop-
ments and related non-legal practices, such as changes in commercial
and corporate law in the light of major trends in the American econ-
omy. He also insisted that "background"--i.e., history-was essential
for an understanding of law as a social institution; he sketched a course
on American Institutions whose purpose would be to provide the his-
torical background for all of private law. Its scope can be grasped from
his description of its first section: America from 1830 to 1860; its eco-
nomic and political institutions--"the going whole"--against which
"the simpler, older forms of such concepts as pledge, chattel mortgage,
realty mortgage, bill, note, suretyship, take on life and meaning."02
While Llewellyn was thus more explicit than Frank about the need
to go beyond the case method of training, he too did not clearly
distinguish and then connect the problems of technical proficiency
and social theory, particularized description and general values, educa-
tional reform and professional change.93 Like Frank, he proposed to
transcend the case system by immersing students even further in its
90. This perspective is urged both in On What is Wrong With So-Called Legal Educa.
tion, supra note 26, at 669-670, and in On The Problem of Teaching 'Private" Law, 54
H v. L. REv. 775 (1941).
91. On the Problem of Teaching 'Private' Law, supra note 90, at 791.
92. Id. at 793.
93. Cf. Judith Shklar's argument that
one may doubt the efficacy of the many schemes devised to reorient the thinking
of lawyers by altering legal education in America... Many academic laX7'ers would
like to see a public-spirited political elite replace the private-law practicing lawyers
whom they now teach ....
That changes in the curriculum are the answer to all public deficiencies is, of
course, in keeping with the great American tradition of painless reform .... What
has not been shown, however, is that changes in the content of courses alter the social
behavior and attitudes of students once they enter upon their professional life.
LJaxims., supra note 1, at 18-19.
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details; a broad reality, in effect, was to be refracted through the mar-
ginal growth of legal doctrine. This approach to teaching and an-
alyzing law contained a potential merging of "doctrine" and "reality,0 4
paradoxically undercutting the basic realist impulse to separate words
and behavior and to use behavior as a basis for criticizing established
rules and realizing new ones.
There is a rough analogy between the realists' conception of their
intellectual enterprise and their conception of educational reform. In
their work on the legal process, the realists focused on empirical in-
vestigation and the conceptual framework for such investigation: be-
havior studies, "squaring" doctrine against facts, "pragmatic states-
manship," judicial fact-finding. Some of them, particularly Frank and
Llewellyn, were aware that something larger than empirical method
was needed to supply a professional model for making, practicing, and
studying law, and that this model or paradigm involved values, con-
cepts, and theories as well as contact with "reality." But they thought
very little about the probable connections between the level of finding
out "how it works" and the level of constructing a paradigm. Simi-
larly, in education they realized that a new "method" of interpreting
cases opened up large questions about how to study society and the
legal system. But they tended to evade these questions through vague
ideals of craft addressed primarily to pragmatic technique, and not
directly to the difficult issues of what values the profession should sup-
port, how manpower should be allocated and paid for, and what kinds
of intellectual, material, and political developments were required to
realize their social and educational ideals.
II. The Legacy of Pragmatism
The pragmatists (both inside and outside the law) and legal realists
addressed themselves to some of the most important social problems
of their time: the structure and content of education, including legal
education; the meaning of the "public interest" in the political and
economic systems; and the nature and function of law. Their intel-
lectual framework for thinking about these problems was a supposedly
neutral method which rejected absolute categories and emphasized the
interplay of reason and reality in terms of particular problems and
concrete consequences. This framework included, however, a number
94. For evidence of such merging, see Levin Goldschmidt's views as adopted by Llewel-
lyn in Tim CoMMoN LAW TRADTION, supra note 89.
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of submerged and difficult questions. What was never clear, for ex-
ample, was the nature and source of the "ends" for which instrumental
theories were to be used, or of the standards by which the "effective-
ness" of solutions was to be measured. The pragmatists proposed, in
effect, a methodological (or even epistemological) solution to political
problems; the nature of knowledge, and the meaning of law, was as-
serted to be particular, concrete, and experimental.05 As heirs of this
tradition, it is not surprising that the realists (despite their focus on
practice) found themselves caught up in philosophical debates; that
they often blended the descriptive and the normative; and that they
had difficulty "following through" on the level of educational reform.
The political effects of submerging value questions under pragmatic
technique were striking. Pragmatism, which presented itself as a
neutral method for enhancing man's capacity to act, tended to become
distorted in one of two directions. If the pragmatist used his instru-
mental theory to dominate reality, i.e. to change social practices so
as to conform with his ideas, he could be criticized for violating demo-
cratic values of self-determination. "The new radicals [progressive-
pragmatists] could speak of the need to liberate the creative energies
of mankind and in the same breath talk of 'adjusting men . . . in
healthful relations' to one another. The study of the inner man could
degenerate into a technique of manipulating him in accordance with
your own designs .... ",6
The temptation of abusive power, however, was rarely available to
liberal intellectuals in a pure form; the price of power was almost
always the second distortion of pragmatism, namely the general domi-
nation of the instrumental theory by the established reality it was sup-
posed to transform. Instead of changing social institutions on the basis
of pragmatic reason, the pragmatic reformer often became their apolo-
gist and technician. A dramatic example of this "subordination" of
thought to power9 7 occurred in World War I, when the progressive-
95. See W. JAMEs, supra note 32, at 45, 158, and the anal)sis of the political impli-
cations of Dewey's philosophy and psychology in C. W. Mius, Socor.oGY ANxD PrAc:.A-
Trsss, supra note 51, at 432-33. Expressions of this position by legal realists can be found
in LAWN AND THE MODERN MIND at 105 and in Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism,
supra note 21, in JURISPRUDENCE at 67.
96. C. LAscr, supra note 31, at 145-146.
97. On "counterrevolutionary subordination," see N. CnomsryS, Objectivity and Liberal
Scholarship, in AimEicAN PowER AND THE NEw MANDARIs (Penguin ed. 190); O'Brien,
Politics and the Mforality of Scholarship, in Tm MoRArr oF ScuoLtArsnp (Black ed. 1967).
Chomsky discusses not only gross examples of scholarship in the service of state power
(e.g. "'experiments with population and resources control methods' in Vietnam," Cosm=y,
supra at 24), but also an example "of a much more subtle and interesting sort"-the effect
of unconscious ideological biases on historical perception of a radical movement. (Id. at
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pragmatists around The New Republic, including John Dewey, sup-
ported the war as justifiable and beneficial. Randolph Bourne saw in
Dewey's stand the end of pragmatism as a critical social philosophy;
it could only work, he concluded, in "a society at peace, prosperous,
and with a fund of good will."98 In any serious social crisis, "this
philosophy of intelligent control just does not measure up to our
needs." 99
Is there something in these realistic attitudes [pragmatism] that
works actually against... concern for the quality of life as above
the machinery of life? Apparently there is. The war has revealed
a younger intelligentsia, trained up in the pragmatic dispensation,
immensely ready for the executive ordering of events, pitifully
unprepared for the intellectual interpretation or the idealistic
focusing of ends . . . Their education has not given them a
coherent system of large ideas, or a feeling for democratic goals.
They have, in short, no clear philosophy of life except that of
intelligent service, the admirable adaptation of means to ends.100
What divided Bourne from his pragmatist contemporaries was his
insistence on considering the submerged questions of value in the prag-
matist approach. For Bourne, "efficiency," "least waste," "workability"
and other technological expressions of the public good were fraudulent
and destructive; the pragmatic "instruments" turned out to mask value
choices in much the same way as the logic of the formalists,101 and to
serve destructive ends. Bourne's judgment about American involve-
ment in the First World War depended, of course, on his pacifist
values and his political analysis. But he could not even state his position
until the questions of value which pragmatism masked could be arti-
103.) While they did not use the term "subordination," both C. Wright Mills and Robert
Lynd made substantially the same point about social science research in America. See
Tim SOCIOLOGICAL IMAGINATION, supra note 64, at 113-132, and (NOW.rnoE roR wIIAT?,
supra note 64, at 182-185. See also A. GOULDNER, supra note 62a, at 496.502.
98. R. BouRNE, Twilight of the Idols, in UNrrxMvFLY PAPERs 114, 119 (1919). Discussions
of the Dewey-Bourne debate can be found in C. LAscH, supra note 31, at 181-224, and
M. WHrE, supra note 29, at 167-172.
99. Twilight of the Idols, supra note 98, at 127.
100. Id. at 128, 130. In our society where intellectuals of many kinds arc Increasingly
employed as technicians of war and social control, Bourne's thoughts have a strikingly
contemporary ring. They are quoted, for example, in the introduction to N. CoMswY,
supra note 97; see also McDermott, Technology: Opiate of the Intellectuals, N.Y. Rzv. op
Boois, July 31, 1969, at 25.
101. Cf. the discussion of what might be called "the natural law of experts" in J.
SHKLAR, supra note 1, at 96-98. "[The concept of 'scientific' expertise] assumes that there
is a 'public good' which a wise man-now an 'expert'-can discover and to which all
must agree as a proved necessity. It is 'there,' as the law was 'there' for the old courts,
.. The neutrality of expertise is not different from that of the idealized bench. Both
demand a poltically antiseptic atmosphere in order to deliver decisions that are Inescap.
able by virtue of their rational necessity." (Id. at 97.)
1174
Vol. 79: 1153, 1970
Legal Theory and Legal Education
culated dearly, until the level of debate was shifted from the ad-
ministrative to the political. The core of Bourne's debate with Dewey
was not about the First World War; it was about the social function
of reason.
10 2
The outlines of this debate can be seen in the endemic struggle over
the role of values in the social sciences;"0 3 in the United States, this
has often taken the form of a duel between pragmatism and its critics.
The critics' basic point is that any intellectual analysis of a social situ-
ation, whether conceived as "purely observational" or as part of a
broad social theory or as somewhere in the "middle range," is neces-
sarily linked to values and carries moral and political implications. 04
"Reason" can indeed serve, as the pragmatists and realists advocated, as
a kind of instrumental technique, finding its values among the products
of concrete practices. But this function is not "objective" or "natural;"
it is itself a choice with intellectual assumptions and political implica-
tions.
As some law schools become increasingly concerned with what is
called "social policy," it seems inevitable that legal scholarship and
education will be drawn into the history and contemporary versions
of this debate. First, social science, to which many lawyers look for
theories and methods, has itself responded to increased social conflict
with critical re-examination of its empirical tradition. In political
science and sociology, where pragmatist paradigms have been strong,
"normative theory" is currently undergoing a renaissance as the limita-
102. Rare examples of efforts in American legal scholarship to incorporate this level of
analysis include Lasswell & McDougal, supra note 5, and Reich, The Law of the Planned
Society, 75 YALE LJ. 1227 (1966). For an analysis of the tendency of "legalistic thought"
or "legalism" to assume, promote, and (where possible) enforce an ideology of consensus
and agreed-upon rules, see J. SHKLAR, supra note 1. Discussions of the social function of
reason as seen by the progressive and pragmatist reformers can be found in C. LAsct,
supra note 31, and M. WHrrfE, supra note 29. For general discussions of the social function
of reason in the social sciences, see, e.g., R. LYND, supra note 64; C.W. MLUS, supra note
64; Marcuse, supra note 64; R. DAmENDORF, EssYs wx Tu THEORy OF Socr=" (196q;
Nettl, Ideas, Intellectuals, and Structures of Dissent, in ON INrrucruuAs (P. Rieff ed.
1969); N. CHomsKY, supra note 97; and McDermott, supra note 100.
103. An excellent discussion of this debate, which assumed a highly structured form
in Germany, can be found in R. DAna uNDos., supra note 102, at 1-18.
104. See, e.g., R. LY'ND, supra note 64, at 185; C.W. MiLLS, supra note 64, at 87-112.
Mills surveys the ideological and bureaucratic uses of economics, statistics, history, and
political science, and concludes that "the ideological relevance of social science is inherent
in its very existence as social fact. Every society holds images of its own nature-in particu-
lar, images and slogans that justify its system of power.... The images and ideas pro-
duced by social scientists may or may not be consistent with these preimailing images, but
they always carry implications for them." (id. at 92) "1 mention these ... implications
neither in criticism nor in an attempt to prove bias. I do so merely to remind the reader
that social science is inevitably relevant to bureaucratic routines and ideological issues,
that this relevance is involved in the variety and confusion of the social sciences today,
and that their political meanings might better be made explicit than left hidden." (id. at
95-96).
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tions of "value-free" science become increasingly evident. 105 And as
Kuhn's work indicates, developments in philosophy and the history
of science are generating a more complex picture of what it means to
do "empirical observation." Thus at the very least, if legal scholars are
serious about adopting the methods of science and the social sciences,
they will find themselves embroiled in debates about the assumptions
of the pragmatist tradition.
Second, the pressures of social and political conflict on the law and
legal institutions are making it increasingly difficult to accept the
pragmatic idea that there are widely-shared values (such as the "public
interest") under which questions of public policy can be settled by
rational technique. At least two law professors have recently written
about the impact of these pressures on legal education, and have ar-
rived at opposite conclusions. Professor Charles Black has pointed out
that the work of the legal profession has been traditionally defined in
our culture as work within a social consensus, a kind of fine-grained
implementation and generation of social values, and he traces much of
the current anxiety in the law schools to the sense that many current
"legal issues" born of social conflict cannot be resolved within the
standard limits of the legal system.
[T]he lawyer can see that the culture in which he lives, and
in which his law must grow or not grow, is light-years away from
being ready to put forth the kind of effort and sacrifice it would
take to give relief against the injustice of poverty. I have implied
that a decent living ought to be a civil right. With this concept,
if the society workingly accepted it, lawyers could deal. But the
society does not accept it ... and the lawyer who would mold it
into the shape of law feels no clay coming into his hands.10
The lesson, as I read Professsor Black, is that lawyers cannot rush in
with realist enthusiasm to "solve social problems"; the struggle for
their solution, at this time, requires skills and efforts far different from
what the legal profession has ever done or could reasonably be ex-
pected to do. The job for the law schools, in such a period of social
conflict, is to contribute their special and traditional skills of "keen
105. See Easton, The New Revolution in Political Science, 63 AMr. POL. SCI. REV, 1051
(1969); Wolin, Political Theory as a Vocation, id. at 1062; Paradigms and Political The,
ories, in POLITICS AND EXPERIENCE: ESSAYS PRESENTED TO PROFESSOR MICHAEL OAMn.IIOTr
(P. King & B. Parekh eds. 1968). In the field of sociology, see, e.g., THE Nnv SocIotoLG:
ESSAYS IN SOCIAL SCIENCE AND SOCIAL THEORY IN HONOR OF C. -WRIGHT MILLS (I. Hloro-
witz ed. 1965); A. GOULDNER, THE COMING CRISIS OF WESTERN SOCIOLOGY 33-37 (1970).
106. Black, Some Notes on Law Schools in the Present Day, 79 YALI L.J. 505, 509 (1970).
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thought and research .... about the rational governance of our
polity"'07 to the necessarily larger and essentially "non-legal" efforts
at social change.
Professor Black's argument is directed at protecting a tradition of
analysis and evaluation-"the reason of the law"' 0 -against move-
ments to transform legal education into a vehicle for "involvement"'10
and the "present relief of misery."' 10 Professor Paul Savoy is also crit-
ical of certain kinds of reform efforts in the law schools, but his
criticism leads in a very different direction. He too takes sharp issue
with the assumption "that lawyers have all the theoretical structures
they need ...and only require the janitorial services of other dis-
ciplines to collect and [process] the facts with which to confirm the
visions they have already fashioned ... I" Such an assumption is
particularly untenable in times of social conflict, when traditional legal
concepts of reasonableness and general utility serve to mask deep di-
visions not only about the solutions of social problems, but also about
their very definition." 2The "reason of the law" thus appears to Savoy
not as the skills of rational criticism, but as an ideological tool in the
service of particular interests and values." 3 Arguing that traditional
legal education is psychologically destructive as well as intellectually
bankrupt," 4 Savoy advocates radical revision of theory, practical tech-
niques, and the day-to-day details of the educational experience."n
Despite their different implicit values, the positions of both Pro-
fessors Black and Savoy raise the problem of how law and politics are
to be studied and understood in a time of social conflict and change.
For the pragmatists, such understanding was to be achieved primarily
by avoiding rigid doctrines and testing concepts against an easily-under-
stood reality. Their approach assumed an underlying harmony of values
in which there was broad agreement about the "meaning" of partic-
ular controversies and the nature of their just or equitable resolution.
107. Id. at 510.
108. Id. at 511.
109. Id. at 506.
110. Id. at 510. Professor Black's article makes it quite dear that he is a strong
supporter of lawyers who devote their energies to the "present relief of misery." His
point is only that law schools serve particular intellectual functions which should not
be weakened in favor of more "activist" forms of education.
111. Savoy, Toward a New Politics of Legal Education, 79 YALE LJ. 444, 496-97
(1970).
112. Id. at 470-71.
113. Id. at 451, 471, 497-98.
114. Id. at 457-62, 481-84.
115. See id. at 485-96.
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Such agreement cannot easily be assumed today. The result is a diffi-
cult challenge for the teachers and students of an intellectual craft: the
need not for new facts alone, but for new ways of understanding facts
and for working with that understanding.
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